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ABSTRACT: Systems of Systems (SoS) present challenging features and existing tools result often inad-
equate for their analysis, especially for heteregeneous networked infrastructures. Most accident scenarios in 
networked systems cannot be addressed by a simplistic black or white (i.e. functioning or failed) approach. 
Slow deviations from nominal operation conditions may cause degraded behaviours that suddenly end 
up into unexpected malfunctioning, with large portions of the network affected. In this paper,we present 
a language for modelling networked SoS. The language makes it possible to represent interdependencies 
of various natures, e.g. technical, organizational and human. The representation of interdependencies is 
based on control relationships that exchange physical quantities and related information. The language 
also makes it possible the identification of accident scenarios, by representing the propagation of failure 
events throughout the network. The results can be used for assessing the effectiveness of those mecha-
nisms and measures that contribute to the overall resilience, both in qualitative and quantitative terms. 
The presented modelling methodology is general enough to be applied in combination with already exist-
ing system analysis techniques, such as risk assessment, dependability and performance evaluation. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Civil and industrial installations do not work in 
isolation, and in many cases they form networks 
of Systems of Systems (SoS). Examples can be 
found in modern infrastructures such as power 
grids, ICT communications and transportation 
networks, civil emergency services and many other 
fields (Valerdi 2008, Maier 1998). What mostly dis-
tinguish a networked infrastructure from a com-
plex system is the open architecture. The diverse 
elements interconnect as long as they possess the 
requisites of interoperability and they must also be 
able to adapt to the user's demand. Nonetheless, 
several problems of integration exist when deal-
ing with systems that are heterogeneous and even 
more subtle issues come into play when consider-
ing hazards and accident scenarios. 
These issues are recognized as difficult to model 
and often beyond the capabilities of traditional 
engineering tools, especially when they concern 
the analysis of interdependencies, vulnerabilities 
and resilience. Because of the diversity of the 
considered quantities, these are often addressed 
separately. Interdependencies analysis is addressed 
on the structural representation of the network 
(Rinaldi et al. 2001, Panzieri et al. 2008, Laprie 
et al. 2007), while vulnerabilities may be structural 
and behavioral at the same time (Egan 2007, Bomp-
ard et al. 2009, Ouyang et al. 2009, Johansson et al. 
2010), and resilience is mostly behavioral (Madni 
et al. 2009, Hollnagel et al. 2006). This approach is 
effective to reduce the scope of the analysis, though 
it underestimates the existing mutual implications 
among the different quantities. 
This paper presents a language for modeling 
the resilience of networks and infrastructures, the 
Infrastructure Resilience-oriented Modeling Lan-
guage (I®ML). The language aims at broadening 
the scope of the representation to all players that 
may take a role in operation scenarios and are rel-
evant to resilience. These players/components are 
called domains, and maintain their specificities 
(technical, organizational) without being an obsta-
cle to the representation that, for this reason, is 
heterarchical andcross-sectoral. 
The I®ML language is not specifically addressed 
to system design, rather it is conceived to support 
decision making and may be integrated into a 
risk assessment framework. The language is also 
accompanied by tools for the analysis of interde-
pendencies, vulnerabilities and resilience. A case 
study is taken from the NIST smart grid in order 
show an example of model building with I®ML 
and further resilience analysis. 
The paper is structured as it follows: section 2 
provides an overview of the proposed language: 
section 3 introduces a few analysis insights; sec-
tion 4 presents the case study, which is analyzed 
in section 5. Section 6 contains final remarks and 
conclusions. 
2 I®ML: INFRASTRUCTURE RESILIENCE 
MODELLING LANGUAGE 
The I®ML model of an SoS is heterarchical, with 
technical and organizational elements considered 
together. In I®ML functions/services are more 
important than the physical implementation and 
behavioral elements (the control relationships) are 
also included. These modelling features will be illus-
trated in this paper on a Smart Grid case study (NIST 
2010). The I®ML model is shown in figure 1. 
The key elements in any I®ML model are 
"domains" and "resources". The concept of 
"domain" comes from Jackson's Problem Frames 
(Jackson 2000). In I®ML, a domain is a set of phe-
nomena that represents a technological or organi-
zational component in the real world. There are 
also "resources", that are special kind of domains 
that represent goods, materials and information 
either produced or consumed. They relate to each 
other via control relationships, which support the 
exchange of information among the elements and 
pursue a particular goal. A control relationship is 
represented by an oriented arc with a filled "o" in 
the controller side and an empty "o" in the con-
trolled side. For instance, in figure 1 there is a con-
trol relationship that ties together the "Customer 
Energy mgmt. System (5)" (controller domain) and 
the "Customer Appliances and Equipment (3)" 
(controlled domain). The relationship may also 
be unidirectional, e.g. a domain can read the state 
of another domain,but can not change it. This is 
expressed with an arrow (for example, in figure 1, 
the "meter (8)" is read, but not changed, by the 
"Customer Energy mgmt System (5)"). Connec-
tions among domains and resources express the fact 
that a domainconsumes, or provides, a resource. 
A set of tightly connected domains constitutes 
a system and every system provides a service. Sys-
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Figure 1. I®ML partial representation of the Smart Grid (NIST). 
terns are delimited by dashed lines, and an arrow 
links the system with the service provided. For 
example, in figure 1 the "transmission" system pro-
vides the "keep desired level" service. The figure 
also shows how this system relies on other services 
("manage load during peaks and emergencies" and 
"operations support"). A service can also relate to 
another service, for example "regulation of energy 
consumption" and "provide balanced flow". For a 
detailed description of the language, see (Silva & 
Filippini2011). 
The idea of "domain", despite its apparent 
abstractness, is actually what will allow I®ML to 
model cross-sector issues, and resilience is cross-
sector. This approach worked very well in Jack-
son's Problem Frames (Jackson 2000). For design, 
more accurate, sector-specific models are required. 
However, I®ML is not a design-oriented model 
and its purpose is to support resilience analysis. 
3 SYSTEM RESILIENCE ANALYSIS 
AND I®ML 
3.1 Modeling and analysis framework 
The I®ML model is part of a modeling and analy-
sis framework specially conceived to assess resil-
ience in networked SoS. This framework includes 
the following stages: 
1. I®ML model construction, 
2. Interdependency analysis, with the Goal 
Dependency Structure, 
3. Generation of resilience scenarios and 
4. Resilience analysis. 
The I®ML model was already introduced in the 
previous section. The other stages of the frame-
work are described in this section. 
3.2 The goal dependency structure 
A Goal Dependency Structure (GDS) represents 
the interdependencies, expressed in term of goals, 
among the components of an SoS, for an assumed 
nominal operational scenario. Any I®ML model 
can be transformed in a GDS. The GDS of figure 2 
is derived from the I®ML in figure 1. The pas-
sages necessary to transform the I®ML model into 
the goal dependency structure are here omitted. 
A detailed explanation can be found in (Silva & 
Filippini2011). 
The services that are provided by a system, are 
here represented with large ovals and further speci-
fied with the internal control goals that must be 
satisfied in order to provide the service. Systems 
are represented with dashed squares, but the GDS 
can beexplored ignoring them, as they serve just 
to label the related goals. In this way, dashed lines 
delimit the goals related to the delivery of a service. 
The goals refer to the control relationships that are 
established among domains in the I®ML model. 
There are two kinds of relationships in a depend-
ency structure: 
1. Depends-on relationship: expresses that a serv-
ice depends on another service, or that a goal 
depends on a service, and they are represented 
with arrows. For instance, the service "regula-
tion of energy consumption" depends on "keep 
desired level". Reading backwards, if "keep 
desired level" is not achieved, this will impact 
on "regulation of energy consumption". 
2. Consists-of relationship: expresses which sys-
tem goals, within a system, are needed to pro-
vide a service. Conversely, it expresses that a 
system-provided service is carried out if some 
system-internal goals are achieved, at vary-
ing levels of quality. It is said, then, that the 
service consists-of those goals. Graphically, it 
is expressed with a line ended by a diamond. 
For instance, the "manage load during peaks" 
service consists-of the goals labelled as U106, 
U33 (mediated by the "load management sys-
tem" which, as said, can be ignored as it is just 
shown for the purpose of illustrating the origin 
of the goals) and U44, U41 (mediated by the 
"customer energy management" box). 
3.3 Resilience scenarios and resilience analysis 
A "resilience scenario" is the evolution in time 
of the off-nominal set-up. In this respect, it is the 
dynamic representation of what can go wrong. 
Dynamics are driven by events, either undesired 
or generated by the response of the systems. Each 
resilience scenario is a particular sequence of 
events that goes from the non-achievement of a 
goal to the final end state. This can be the recovery 
back to the nominal operation scenario or a non-
recoverable scenario. Indeed, the process of resto-
ration of services in the network is crucial and it 
may happen that it cannot be completed. 
The generation of resilience scenarios consists 
of the definition of the off-nominal scenario set 
up, from which the resilience scenarios are gener-
ated. An off-nominal set-up consists of: 1) one goal 
that is assumed to be non achieved, and 2) the set 
of goals that are potentially affected. The off-nom-
inal set up is obtained by exploration of the goal-
dependency structure, in an inductive way: e.g. the 
non achievement of goal A affects goal B and C, 
and so forth. It is a static representation of what 
can go wrong, and to which extent the undesired 
event can propagate. This is not a combinatorial 
technique of system analysis, like reliability graphs 
Figure 2. Goal Dependency Structure. 
or fault trees, as the non achievement of a goal only 
returns those goals that are potentially affected due 
to the propagation of an undesired event. 
The identification of resilience scenarios is of 
inductive nature and systematic. The analyst has 
at his disposal a finite number of options, that 
define the "what-if" in terms of system response, 
and the "what-happens-next" to those goals that 
are inthe neighborhood. The non achievement 
of a goal implies that the system is challenged 
to survive. Given this challenge, the system may 
resist, react or break down. We provide a system-
atic approach for the identification of the resil-
ience scenarios from an assumed non-achieved 
goal. The resilience measures counteract different 
events in a diverse way. (i) Preventive measures 
implement robustness to perturbations and toler-
ance to faults. They are able to locally contain the 
effect of perturbation/fault, up to certain thresh-
old, thus avoiding the propagation, (ii) Reactive 
measures counteract misbehaviors by controls in 
combination with fault management systems (for 
reconfiguration and recovery). As opposed to pre-
ventive measures, reactive measures cannot impair 
that a perturbation (or fault) may propagate. 
Sometimes they are the cause of the propagation. 
The generation of resilience scenarios from the 
GDS, for the given goal, ends when all the goals of 
the off-nominal set-up have been visited. Clearly, 
the number of resilience scenarios generated may 
be very large. Still, it is important that the genera-
tion process is exhaustive. Pruning can be done, for 
instance, by clustering scenarios that develop in a 
similar way and/or terminate with the same conse-
quences, or by prioritizing scenarios with respect 
to a judgment criteria, e.g. based on risk, perform-
ance, etc. 
In the last stage of the framework, a resilience 
analysis is conducted on the resilience scenarios. 
There are different approaches and techniques 
that may be applied to the purpose. It will depend 
on the type of analysis required, e.g. probabilistic 
or deterministic, and the quantity of interest, e.g. 
performance, risk, etc. The idea is to consider this 
final step as an interface with existing analysis and 
simulation tools. For instance, Bayesian networks 
(Ben-Gal 2007) can be mapped to a dependency 
structure. 
4 CASE STUDY: THE SMART GRID 
4.1 Scope and assumptions 
The presented example is taken from the "NISTIR 
7628" documents on the Smart Grid. Those docu-
ments were prepared by the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology. In particular, the source 
material for this case study comes from the docu-
ment "Guidelines for Smart Grid Cyber Security: 
Vol. 1" (NIST 2010), which includes a representa-
tion of the different high-level actors in the Smart 
Grid. Schemes and models in the NIST documents 
(NIST 2010) are complex, widely encompassing and 
represented with a particular, boxes-and-arrows, ad-
hoc notation. This is an issue that pervades many 
representations of critical infrastructures, among 
other problems (Hollnagel et al. 2006, Egan 2007, 
Silva & Filippini 2011). In the reference documents 
there are different areas of concern and within each 
area there are actors that collaborate and commu-
nicate by several means and through a variety of 
interfaces. The NIST framework identifies seven 
areas1 within the Smart Grid: (1) Transmission, (2) 
Distribution, (3) Operations, (4) Bulk generation, (5) 
Markets, (6) Customer and (7) Service. 
For our modeling purposes, we have restricted 
the study to three areas of the Smart Grid: trans-
mission, distribution and customer areas. Within 
the chosen areas we also made a selection of the 
core actors, whose joint collaborative goal is to 
avoid energydisruptions and provide a balanced 
energy flow. Those actors will be considered as 
I®ML domains, and grouped here into systems. 
4.2 Description of the Smart Grid I®ML model 
The I®ML model in figure 1 represents the three 
areas of the NIST Smart Grid model that are within 
the scope of the case studied. Names and identifi-
ers of the different elements (actors and interfaces) 
are taken directly from the NIST document for the 
purpose of cross-referencing. A detailed descrip-
tion of the systems, the domains involved and the 
service provided follows. 
The load management (customer) system pro-
vides the "manage load during peaks/emergencies'' 
service. The system relies on the services "opera-
tions support" and "keep desired level". This sys-
tem is composed by five domains: 
LMS/DRMS (#32): Load and Demand-Re-
sponse Management System. Issues load man-
1. Actually, the NIST document calls "domains" to those 
areas, but that term conflicts with "domain" in I®ML . 
In this paper, the "domains" correspond to the actors in 
the NIST document. 
agement commands to customer appliances. 
It also issues signals aimed at increasing or 
decreasing customer loads. It controls the "cus-
tomer energy management system" (domain #5) 
with the goal of sending local management com-
mands to the customer site (U106). For taking 
the correct decision, it depends on the informa-
tion provided by the Customer Information Sys-
tem CIS (#23). 
CIS (#23): Customer Information System. It 
consists of a set of applications for managing 
the company relationships with its customers. It 
must provide customer pricing and load infor-
mation to the LMS/DRMS (#32). 
Meter (#8): Devices for measuring point-of-
sale usage. Data are feed for the decision-making 
process carried out by the EMS (#5). 
EMS (#5): Customer Energy Management 
System. From the data provided by the meters 
(#8, U41) and the commands sent by the LMS/ 
DRMS (#32, U106), this domain will issue those 
decisions aimed to efficiently control energy 
consumption (U44) at the customer end (#3). 
Customer end (#3): Customer Appliances and 
Equipment. They are customer appliances (toast-
ers and televisions, for instance) which perform a 
specific function for the customer. Their energy 
consumption is controlled (U44) by the customer 
energy management system EMS (#5). 
The transmission system provides the "keep desired 
level" service, where "desired level" refers to voltage 
"within the parameters established by the company". 
It relies on the services "manage loads during peaks/ 
emergencies" and "operations support". The system 
is composed by the following domains: 
Transmission JED (#46): Transmission Intelli-
gent Electronic Devices. Reads information from 
the Transmission Engineering equipment (#49). 
Its goal (U81) is to maintain the voltage level by 
sensing anomalies and sending voltage manage-
ment commands (or tripping circuit breakers). 
It depends on data read from the Transmission 
Engineering status (U135) 
Transmission SCADA (#37): Transmission 
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition. 
Transmits device status and sends commands 
to the Transmission RTU (#47) for controlling 
power system equipments and manage energy 
consumption (U82). 
Transmission RTU (#47): Transmission 
Remote Terminal Unit. Cooperates with 
SCADA (#37) by sending status information on 
equipment and transmitting the control com-
mands (received from SCADA) to field equip-
ment (U136) at Transmission Engineering. 
Transmission Engineering (#49): It consists of 
equipment between conductor lines, designed 
for more than 345,000 volts. Its status is moni-
tored by the Transmission IED (#46). 
Finally, the distribution system provides the 
"regulation of energy consumption" service and 
relies on the service "managed outages". The sys-
tem is composed by the following domains: 
Distribution Engineering (#26): Domain for 
planning and managing the design or upgrade 
of the distribution system (addition of new cus-
tomers, reconfiguration of capital investments, 
etc.). The relevancy for this model stands in 
the fact that it isDistribution Engineering who 
informs the Distribution RTUs/IEDs (#15) 
about reconfigurations (U109). 
Distribution RTUs/IEDs (#15): Distribution 
Remote Terminal Unit and Intelligent Elec-
tronic Devices. Cooperates with the Distribu-
tion Generation (#25) with the goal (U137) of 
level maintenance by issuing control commands 
to correct frequency and voltage anomalies. 
Distribution SCADA (#29): Distribution 
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition. It 
acquires and transmits distribution device sta-
tus (U117) and manages consumption by con-
trolling (U65) the Distribution Generation and 
Storage Management (#25) domain. 
Distr. Generation and Storage Mgmt (#25): 
Generation of electricity from small energy 
sources. Reduces the amount of energy lost in 
transmission, as it is generated near where it will 
be used, helping to regulate energy consumption 
(overall goal of the distribution system). 
4.3 Derived goal dependency structure 
The GDS derived from the I®ML model is shown 
in figure 2. Control relationships in I®ML becomes 
goals in the GDS. For instance, the "transmission" 
system subgoals correspond to the control goals 
of the domains "transmission SCADA" (#37), 
"transmission IED"(#46) and "transmission 
RTU" (#47). For the sake of convenience, the goals 
have been labelled with the name of the connection 
they correspond to. In this way, the GDS shows 
that "transmission SCADA" needs the U82 goalto 
be achieved, "Transmission IED" needs the U135 
and U81 goals, etc. The U81 control goal depends 
also on the external "operations support" service, 
which is provided by another system that has been 
left out of the scope of this analysis. 
The GDS shows several interesting dependen-
cies. For instance, it shows that "meter info" has a 
dependency on the service Omaintenance of the 
desired levelO. This is due to the fact that modern 
meters are connected to the electrical line just as any 
other electrical appliance, not via an independent 
line. Hence, if the level is not appropriate, the meters 
may malfunction and the returned info will become 
inaccurate.EExperts will be able to quantify the con-
sequences of this scenario. In any case IRML helps 
to identify that loop, and forces analyst to consider 
it. On another side, we can see that some distribution 
system subgoals depends on the "managed outages" 
service. Managed outages (or power restoration, in 
other words) is one of the services that "distribu-
tion" relies on (distribution relies on power to be 
restored). In addition, "accurate data from sensors" 
in the transmission system has a dependency rela-
tionship with the "manage load during peaks" serv-
ice. This is because the sensors that communicate the 
transmission system status are necessary in order to 
manage voltage (or trip circuit breakers). The load 
is managed at the customer side, as fluctuations can 
lead to inaccurate readings. It could happen that a 
quick peak makes the distribution system decide 
that some action is to be taken, erroneously. 
5 ANALYSIS OF RESILIENCE SCENARIOS 
A key feature of a Goal Dependency Structure 
(GDS) is that, by exploring it, it is possible to iden-
tify the goals that are reachable from a given goal 
(and that depend on it), under "nominal opera-
tion conditions". The exploration is facilitated by 
the fact that the GDS is an oriented graph. The 
relationship depends on has the dependent goal on 
the tail place and because of that, the visit must 
be performed backwards the direction specified by 
the arcs. When a service goal is encountered, this is 
replaced with its depending goals. 
The GDS provides the necessary information 
in order to perform a resilience analysis. Starting 
from the assumption that one goal is not achieved, 
it is possible to evaluate the potential impact onto 
the remaining goals. Each goal of the GDS is given 
a set of resilience measures, which are associated to 
the non achievement of that goal, either because of 
internal or external causes. The effect (of the non 
achievement of a goal) may remain confined, or it 
propagates to the next goal. A resilience scenario 
is complete when a terminal event is reached. This 
may be a recovery action (back to nominal condi-
tions) or a non recoverable failure. 
An example of generation of resilience scenario 
is analyzed in the case that the meter info goal U41 
(gl) is not achieved. Six goals depend on gl: "energy 
consumption U44" (g2), "accurate data from sen-
sors and power equipments Ul 35" (g3), "trip circuit 
breakers U137" (g4), "control of energy consump-
tion U82" (g5), "transmit info and controls U136" 
(g6), "regulation of energy consumption" (g7). The 
service "provide balanced flow" is obviously con-
cerned too, though it is not included in the exam-
ple. In order to understand to which extent these 
goals are affected, one has to consider the resilience 
measures in place. In the case studied, we assumed 
that every goal may have two measures: detection 
of the perturbing event (d) and recovery (r). Detec-
tion and recovery are abstractions of actual techni-
cal or organizational measures. 
The resilience scenarios generated from goal 
gl are shown in Figure 3. The first scenario (SI) 
corresponds to the (event) goal gl non achieved, 
detected and recovered. If goal gl is not achieved (-), 
propagation is possible up to goal g6, as goals 2-5 
are here assumed to be passive (see definition in 
the following paragraphs). Again two possibilities 
exist. The non achievement of goal g5 is detected at 
g6 and recovery is performed, which corresponds 
to scenario S2. The effectmay also propagate to g7, 
which is the worst case. The SCADA will generate 
inconsistent controls, thus affecting the regulation 
of energy consumption goal g7. The goal g7 may 
detect the off-nominal conditions, stop propaga-
tion and recover, giving origin to scenario S3. But 
it is also possible that propagation affects next 
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Figure 3. Resilience scenarios generated by goal gl non 
achieved (meter info). 
goal, leading to scenario S4. This is the last gener-
ated scenario, for the given example. The analysis 
may continue if other components outside of the 
scope are included. 
In total, four resilience scenarios are identi-
fied from the non achievement of goal gl, three 
of which lead to the successful recovery back to 
nominal conditions. It is important to remark that 
the later the detection and the bigger the time to 
recover, and this impacts onto the duration of the 
service outage and the consequences. Early (local) 
detection is also the most effective measures to 
contain a fault and avoid propagation, though it 
might not be always possible. When the propaga-
tion affects a large number of goals, for instance 
in S3, the recovery process will be longer and more 
complex. Recovery time also matters as it is not 
excluded that during the recovery process, other 
goals will be affected. 
The set of resilience measures per goal depends 
on the incoming arcs (i.e. the neighbor goal depend-
encies). As it was shown in the example, they can 
be active or passive with respect to the depend-
ent goal and perturbing event. A goal is defined 
"active"with respect to a dependent goal, if the 
perturbing event is locally detectable and counter-
actable (e.g. g6, g7). The goal is defined "passive" 
with respect to a dependent goal if the perturbing 
event is not detectable and counteractable (e.g. g2, 
g3, g4 and g5). This distinction is important and 
enriches the expressiveness of the model. 
There are other elements relevant to the analy-
sis. The larger the set of reachable goals, the more 
critical the goal is. This information is clearly 
related to the network vulnerability. If combined 
with the identified resilience scenarios, it can assess 
the potential risk, in a qualitative way. 
The example aimed at explaining how to build 
a resilience scenario from the GDS. The number 
of goals is here low, and the dependencies can be 
easy identified from the GDS, as well as the resil-
ience scenarios. For more complex case studies, 
some guidance from experts is envisaged in order 
to avoid state explosion problems. Experts know 
the systems and may judge if the possible altera-
tions in the nominal scenario are (quantitatively or 
qualitatively) sufficient to cause any consequence. 
The space of search can be reduced by eliminating 
those scenarios that are either non significant or 
very unlikely to happen. 
6 CONCLUSIONS 
This paper presented the IRML language for the 
representation of networked infrastructures and 
their resilience analysis. A case study from the NIST 
smart grid served to explain the language and the 
analysis tools. Analogies and differences exist with 
respect to other methodologies of system analysis. 
The identification of the resilience measures for 
each non achieved goal is in good analogy with the 
F M E A (Hoyland & Rausand 1994). In F M E A a 
component fault can be tolerated, detected, diag-
nosed and recovered, as well as in I R M L a non 
achieved goal can be counteracted by the ability 
of the system of resisting, detecting and recovery. 
The analogy also exists with the Probabilistic Risk 
Assessment framework, and in particular with the 
construction of the event sequence diagram (Full-
wood 2000), which resembles to the generation of 
resilience scenarios from an assumed non-achieved 
goal (the triggering event). 
Among the differences and introduced innova-
tions, this language is conceived to describe the 
behavior of a networked system at higher level. 
The scope of the representation includes compo-
nents and players that are heterogeneous and cross-
sector. The goaldependency structure is another 
important innovation. Although resembling to a 
logic tree-structure, it cannot be compared to any 
of the existing combinatorial system analysis tech-
niques (i.e reliability graph, fault tree) (Hoyland & 
Rausand 1994). The non achievement of a goal in 
the G D S discloses a number of scenarios in which 
the system is challenged to resist, react, recover, in 
a word showing its resilience features (Madni et al. 
2009). The fact that there is no stringent logic, 
makes the search space (of what can go wrong) to 
be very large. This will require rules forbounding 
the generation of scenarios only to those that are 
realistic and significant. 
The set of resilience scenarios is the final out-
come of the I R M T modeling framework. This is 
also the input to further system analysis, which we 
envisage as one of the next research topics. The 
resilience scenarios, analyzed qualitatively in the 
I R M T framework, could be analyzed quantita-
tively by existing system analysis tools, by simula-
tions or even reproducing them by experiments, 
thus integrating the diverse methodologies into a 
comprehensive modeling framework. 
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